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ABSTRACT
Modern organizations face significant information security threats, to which they respond with various
managerial techniques. It is widely believed that “one size does not fit all” for achieving employee informa-
tion security policy compliance; nevertheless, it is yet to be determined which techniques work best to
different organizational employees. We further this research stream by finding that different levels of users
might be effectively motivated by different types of coercive and empowering techniques that are suitable
to their level and position in the organizational chart. Our results suggest that participation in the ISP
decision-making process might prove to be a more effective approach to motivate lower-level employees
toward compliance and that enhancing the meaningfulness of policy compliance could be the preferred
method among higher levels of management. Members within each level of the organization can be
effectively influenced to comply with ISPs when such strategies are customized for their level.
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Introduction
On July 20, 2015, the Ashley Madison website’s customer data
were stolen, the systems were compromised, large quantities of
supposedly confidential data were appropriated, and a small
percentage of user account secret affairs data with matching
credit card transactions were exposed to the public [8]. The
hackers threatened to post more data online until the website
closed. The company’s negligent insider(s) probably clicked on a
phishing email and thus unintentionally assisted the hackers [8],
costing the company $370,000. The CEO resigned and two
customers committed suicide after the hackers exposed their
infidelity [65, 82]. Studies have consistently indicated that cur-
rent employees are responsible for over 50% of reported security
breaches [63]. Employees remain the most cited perpetrators of
security incidents and their crimes tend to bemore costly to their
firms than those perpetrated by external sources [63]. Recent
survey results found that employees were responsible for 57% of
attacks against organizational digital assets, with 38% of these
attacks caused by carelessness or lack of awareness [28]. These
figures underscore the perennial mandate of decreasing the risk
of negligent—as well as opportunistic andmalicious—insiders in
organizations. In view of these threats, the recent Cybersecurity
Act of 2015 signed by President Barrack Obama gave network
operators sweeping powers to monitor their own networks to
catch both hackers and insiders alike [44].
Research about external security threats includes technical
capabilities against security attacks [13], information disclosure
[50], and spoofing [46]. Internal security threat research includes
information sharing among peers [38], security factors in deci-
sions pertaining cloud-based solutions [56], information message
risk perceptions [58], and security adoption [66]. We focus on
internal sources, otherwise known as insider threat. We define
insiders as “. . .employees or others who have (1) access privileges
and (2) intimate knowledge of internal organizational processes
that may allow them to exploit weaknesses” [81]. A disgruntled
employee who plants a logic bomb in the server to destroy data
after he/she leaves the organization is an example of a malicious
insider who can inflict great harm.
In contrast, other insiders may pose an information secur-
ity threat by engaging in negligent behaviors not motivated by
malice, acting either non-volitionally or volitionally for
opportunistic purposes [69, 81]. An example of a non-voli-
tional negligent insider is an employee who forgets to back up
his/her data. An example of a volitional negligent insider is an
employee who neglects updating his desktop’s security soft-
ware because he has deadlines to meet. Although non-mal-
icious, these opportunistic insiders may nevertheless pose
indirect threats to the information security of their organiza-
tion. Negligent insiders can be categorized into two subcate-
gories according to their ability and willingness: willing but
unable to comply (naïve acts caused by lack of awareness or
training) and able but unwilling to comply (opportunistic acts
caused by competing goals or lack of motivation). The
absence of malicious intent to harm the company is what
differentiates these two subcategories from malicious insiders.
For an expanded discussion of these categories of behavior,
see [31, 61, 81].
Given that organizations must contend with all insider
threats, ensuring information security policy (ISP) compliance
by employees is a key component for realizing and maintain-
ing information security. Many studies, such as [10, 18],
examine the issue of insider threat mitigation by seeking to
understand employee compliance with ISPs. Until recently,
the primary theoretical lens for studying information security
compliance behavior has been deterrence theory wherein
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studies examine how organizations can deter insiders from
engaging in behaviors that threaten the organization’s infor-
mation security [19]. Recent studies have focused on persua-
sion theory (e.g., [11, 39]). Virtually no study has used both
lenses simultaneously to investigate ISP compliance. Our
study does just this. We investigate whether different levels
of users (managers and employees) are affected by the same
approaches (coercive vs. empowering) to ISP compliance. In
so doing, our research makes an incremental advancement to
information security research that is both novel and impor-
tant in three ways. First, we contextualize theories––Theory X
and Theory Y––and three relevant “empowerment” con-
structs from management, and test them in the important
evaluation of ISP compliance behavior. Second, we test secur-
ity research in a new cultural context (Middle Eastern) and we
challenge the dominant coercive approach by contrasting it
with empowering approaches, and we find that the latter is a
promising way to approach security research in that particular
culture. Third, we reveal that different levels of users may be
affected by different types of coercive and empowering tech-
niques in the context of information security compliance. We
next present our model and hypotheses, followed by our
methodology, findings, implications and conclusions.
Theoretical lens
Coercive vs. empowering approaches
Organizational management approaches toward compliance
depict the attitude of managers toward the insider threat in
organizations and reflect the driving beliefs behind how to
address the threat effectively. The approach can take the form
of coercive power (fear and punishment) or empowering
motivation (nurture and development). These two approaches
are consistent with McGregor’s theory of motivation from
organizational psychology. Theory X and Y describe two
types of management styles: the coercive or authoritarian
style, referred to as Theory X, and the enabling or participa-
tive style, referred to as Theory Y [55]. The coercive manage-
ment style assumes that average people dislike work and need
to be coerced into performing adequately [55] whereas the
enabling style assumes that average people are willing, if
enabled, to perform so as to achieve organizational objectives.
Drawing from McGregor’s Theory X and Y we suggest that
some managers may operate under the assumption that the
average user has an inherent dislike of responsibility and will
avoid compliance where possible [55]. Managers holding this
assumption may apply coercion, command-and-control, and
the threat of punishment for noncompliance. Other managers
may operate under the assumption that users are self-direct-
ing, self-controlling responsible beings in the service of objec-
tives to which they are committed [55]. Under this
assumption, training and empowerment are essential elements
in achieving organizational objectives. The IS discipline is rich
in training [42] and awareness [27] research, but empower-
ment research has yet to be explicitly developed. In this study,
we will develop an empowerment construct. We next describe
how the coercive and empowering approaches may influence
employee motivation to commit to ISP compliance.
Coercive approach
Rooted in the seminal work of criminologists such as
Beccaria, Bentham, and Hobbes, general deterrence theory is
the foundation of the coercive approach for controlling secur-
ity behaviors [74]. General deterrence focuses on the indirect
(or general) prevention of crime by making examples of
specific perpetrators by quickly inflicting a severe and certain
sanction on them. The severity of sanctions refers to the
severity of the punishment that may be inflicted on non-
compliant employees. The certainty of sanctions refers to the
likelihood of getting caught and punished. Sanctions are only
effective if employees are well informed about the penalties
for breaching security [74]. This fear of sanctions has a deter-
rent effect in various contexts, and because deterrence impacts
actual compliance [69], information security may be enhanced
by conveying the potential for strong sanctions such as
employment termination or criminal prosecution [21, 26].
Such severe sanctions are typically applied only to malicious
insiders in cases of fraud, espionage, or purposeful disclo-
sures, but not to negligent violators. However, in the absence
of the threat of punishment, the policies and codes of ethics
themselves offer minimal deterrence value [34]. More
recently, Hsu, Lee and Straub [37] validated that coercive
force increases IS security management adoption and assim-
ilation. Consistent with this extant foundational literature, we
offer our first two hypotheses.
H1: Certainty of sanctions is positively related to information
security policy compliance intention.
H2: Severity of sanctions is positively related to information
security policy compliance intention.
Empowering approach
In contrast to deterrence, empowerment has not attracted
much attention in ISP compliance research [67].
Empowering users might be an alternative to sanctions in
eliciting ISP compliance. Empowering leadership is defined
as “sharing power with employees with a view toward enhan-
cing their motivation and investment in their work” [83].
Empowerment confers greater authority to employees than
they would otherwise enjoy [16]. When the leadership
empowers employees, the latter become creative [83] and/or
more productive [3].
Forms of empowerment as a motivational approach
include fostering participation in decision-making, enhancing
the meaningfulness of work, expressing confidence in high
performance, and providing autonomy from bureaucratic
constraints [83]. One form of empowerment that has already
been studied in the context of ISP compliance is the whistle-
blowing policy [52]. Therefore, we limit our study to the first
three forms of empowerment, as identified in Zhang and
Bartol [52], namely, (1) fostering participation in decision-
making, (2) enhancing the meaningfulness of work, and (3)
expressing confidence in high performance.
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Effect of participation in decision-making on intention to
comply
Given that effective information security is dependent on user
awareness of the risks to information security, user participa-
tion might be useful in achieving this awareness [71]. User
participation is the extent to which users or their representa-
tives take part in systems development [6]. Extending this
notion to ISP, we define user participation in ISP decision-
making as the extent to which users or their representatives
take part in decisions during the formulation of ISPs.
Employees’ participation in decision-making can be
manifested in different policy-making initiatives ranging
from implementing or adopting a new system to ISP devel-
opment [53,71]. Markus and Mao [53] suggest that users
who exert effort and exercise influence in systems develop-
ment projects perceive the new system to be more impor-
tant and relevant than do users who are not involved. This
perception positively influences not just their attitudes but
also their system usage level [35].
Spears and Barki [71] found that user participation in
information security risk analysis and control design directly
raised the perception of improvements in the policies, proce-
dures, safeguards, and countermeasures that prevent, detect,
or minimize a security breach. Although important in terms
of empowerment research, their study did not assess the
impact of user participation on ISP compliance intention.
We argue that when employees are exposed to security risks
and are invited to contribute to the formulation and writing
of policies, they will be more likely to comply with these
policies. This is a form of empowerment. Therefore, we
hypothesize the following:
H3: User participation in decision-making regarding security
policies is positively related to the information security
policy compliance intention.
Effect of enhancing meaningfulness on intention to
comply
Zhang and Bartol [83] defined enhancing the meaningfulness
of work as helping an employee understand the importance of
his/her contribution to the overall organizational effective-
ness. In the information security context, we conceptualize
the meaningfulness of ISP compliance as helping an employee
understand the importance of his/her contribution to the
overall organizational information security through his policy
compliance.
In the broader management context, work meaningfulness
and corporate citizenship positively impact each other [47].
When employees see and understand why they are doing the
work they are doing, they cultivate a stronger sense of respon-
sibility and loyalty toward the employer and even increase
their work performance. Experienced meaningfulness refers to
the sense of meaning an individual draws from engaging in
work activities [25], which positively affects work outcomes
such as work engagement and commitment to the task at
hand [7].
Applying these concepts to ISP compliance, we suggest that
similar psychological forces influence user compliance, such
that users may experience a sense of significance and feel that
they are doing something beneficial for the organization,
community, or world if they understand the purpose of the
behaviors entailed in ISP compliance. When users understand
why they should comply with ISPs, they will commit them-
selves more fully to compliance.
Thus, we argue that management should not only demand
policy compliance, for example, by disabling computer access
if a password is not changed on schedule. Rather, manage-
ment needs to make a concerted effort to explain to employ-
ees, in practical terms and by including the technical details if
needed, why regularly following policy mandates, such as
regularly changing a password, is important and how this
behavior may affect the employee’s daily work life and work
files. In addition, management can be transparent in inform-
ing employees of security breaches and illustrate how many of
the breaches could have been thwarted had each user obliged
the policy. In so doing, ISP compliance may become more
meaningful to the users. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H4: Enhancing the meaningfulness of information security
policy compliance is positively related to the information
security policy compliance intention.
Effect of expressing confidence on intention to comply
When leaders express confidence in employees and have high
expectations of them, employees experience feelings of
empowerment and increased levels of performance [16]. In
the context of ISP compliance, we define the empowerment
approach of expressing confidence as the managerial-level
belief and verbal or behavioral expressions of confidence
toward employees’ high-level performance and competence
regarding ISP compliance. One of the primary reasons that
managerial expressions of confidence in employees have a
positive impact on employee performance is because these
increase employees’ self-efficacy. External cues and organiza-
tional support have been shown to enhance compliance self-
efficacy, which in turn has been shown to increase compliance
intentions [79]. Moreover, managerial expressions of confi-
dence in employees are an important form of managerial
feedback. Managerial feedback benefits employees in terms
of individual as well as team performance and morale [2].
Such feedback may strengthen the confidence of the employ-
ees in what they are doing and increase their self-efficacy.
With regard to information use and policy compliance, the
perception of self-efficacy refers to the perception held by an
individual of his ability to effectively use a system or, in the
case of policy compliance, effectively abide by the policy.
Tangible expressions from management about employees’
high-level performance ability may cause higher perceptions
of self-efficacy, thereby contributing to an increase in com-
pliance intention [79]. Positive feedback from management
about users’ ability to protect the organization’s systems and
data from security breaches may increase the confidence of
users in the importance of compliance and in their ability and
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intent to comply with security policies. Thus, we hypothesize
the following:
H5: Expressions of managerial confidence toward users’
high-level performance regarding information security
compliance is positively related to the information secur-
ity policy compliance intention.
Testing both punishments and rewards together are contrasted
with the results from testing either punishment or rewards alone
[4]. Within IS research, Son [70] tested deterrence (extrinsic
model) along with perceived legitimacy and congruence (intrinsic
model) and found that only the intrinsic model was significant.
Although deterrence is a well-established significant construct,
testing it with another approach yields different results. We test
coercion with an empowering approach, which is an important
yet seldom investigated in information security research. While
positive approaches have been evaluated, they are not empower-
ments per se. For example, Bulgurcu et al. [12] tested intrinsic
benefits (defined as contentment, satisfaction, and accomplish-
ment), safety (perception that IT resources at work are safe-
guarded because of compliance), and rewards (tangible and
intangible compensation in return for compliance). Son [70]
tested the intrinsic model (perceived legitimacy and perceived
congruency). These emerging positive approaches are not
empowering, i.e., things that management can do to practically
empower users. Our focus on empowerment approaches is an
important extension to the IS security policy compliance research.
On the left side of our research model (see Figure 1), we
show sanction certainty and severity, which together comprise
the coercive approach. On the right side, we show the con-
structs of the empowering approach: participation in deci-
sion-making, enhancing the meaningfulness of ISP
compliance, and expressing confidence in high performance
regarding compliance. We also control the model for the
position of the user (managers vs. employees).
Research methodology
We utilized a survey research design that drew data from
multiple organizations. We adapted previously validated
scales to measure the constructs in our research model.
Suitable scales were found in two seminal works in manage-
ment (see Appendix A for the measurement items). To retain
the psychometric properties of the measures, each item in the
questionnaire was measured in its respective original scale
with 5-, 7-, or 11-point Likert scales. After data collection,
we normalized and transformed these measures to an 11-
point Likert scale format to increase the variance of the data
[22, 23]. This type of normalization does not harm the data in
terms of the mean scores and measures of dispersion and
shape [22, 23].
An expert panel comprised of 11 IT professionals and
academicians evaluated the content validity of the items.
After several iterations and changes regarding wording, the
panel reached a consensus that the items were relevant, rea-
listic, genuine, and clearly written. IT professionals in the
country where we conducted data collection were also con-
tacted to verify the relevancy of some of our technical ques-
tions in the environment of the primary data respondents
(e.g., relevance and/or existence of periodic audits of
unauthorized software use on organizational computers in
the country). Furthermore, a panel of 10 respondents from
the same data collection sample pool read the items to eval-
uate their content relevancy and clarity. In summary, all the
individuals in the academic and professional expert panels
reached a consensus that the items were relevant, genuine,
and readable, thereby confirming the content validity.
Pilot test and primary data collection
We pretested the survey with 30 employees and professionals
from our primary data sample pool. The reliability of the
measurement items as well as the discriminant and conver-
gent validity for the reflective constructs were evaluated using
AVE, composite reliability, Cronbach’s alpha, and factor
loadings.
Primary data for this research were collected by adminis-
tering a survey to young professionals attending an educa-
tional program in Lebanon, a Middle Eastern country. All
respondents were either employees or managers in their
workplaces (60% and 40%, respectively) representing more
than 22 different organizations. To increase the voluntary
participation rate, we offered the employees four prizes of
US$100 through a raffle, while retaining the anonymity of
the survey itself.
We used both paper-based and online data collection,
thereby mitigating the common method bias from a single
Participation 
Position 
(Manager or Employee 
as control variables)
Meaningfulness 
Express 
Confidence 
Behavioral Intent 
to Comply 
Sanction 
Severity 
Sanction 
Certainty 
H1 + 
H2 + 
H3 + 
H4 + 
H5 + 
Figure 1. Research model.
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data collection method [60]. In total, 187 usable surveys were
gathered from 380 professionals for a response rate of 49%.
The sample is more than three times the required sample size
(60) to evaluate our model according to the rule of ten
heuristic [5]. Appendix B shows the descriptive statistics of
the primary data. We controlled for gender, age, industry and
size of organization. These control variables did not alter the
analysis results.
Common method variance
Common method variance, which can lead to systematic error
and wrong conclusions about the relationships between con-
structs, is a bias caused by the method of collecting the data
rather than by the constructs and measurement items [60].
We observed Podsakoff et al.’s [60] recommendations to
decrease the sources of common method variance, including
several procedural remedies, as indicated in Appendix C. We
also performed statistical tests to further mitigate these con-
cerns. We performed Harman’s one-factor test [60], which
consists of entering all the items in an unrotated factor ana-
lysis to see if a single factor will emerge or explain the
majority of the variance, which can indicate common method
bias. In our study, 16 factors emerged, the largest of which
accounted for 23% of the variance. Second, the test of partial
correlation was applied, in which a marker variable is intro-
duced into the model to see if it makes a difference in the
relationships [60] (see Appendix A for the marker variable
items). The relationships were altered neither in their signifi-
cance nor in their direction with and without the marker
variable. Therefore, common method bias is not a significant
issue in this study.
Model analysis
We analyzed our theoretical model using partial least squares
analysis [64]. We chose the component-based (PLS) rather
than covariance-based SEM technique to facilitate valid model
development [5,15]. We used SmartPLS version 2.0 (M3) Beta
[64] with 5000 bootstrapping for the analysis and determina-
tion of the paths’ significance in the model.
The measurement model test comprises internal reliability
and convergent and discriminant validity of the measurement
items. Table 1 shows the internal consistency reliabilities. All
constructs but one, scored >.7, which is the recommended
threshold of Cronbach’s alpha [33]. The composite reliability
exceeds the recommended thresholds of .7 [30].
The items demonstrated satisfactory convergent and dis-
criminant validity. Convergent validity is satisfied when the
average extracted variance of each construct is >.5 [30].
Discriminant validity is achieved when the square root of
AVE of each construct in the diagonal is greater than the
variance of all the other constructs [15]. The items showed
satisfactory levels of discriminant validity. Discriminant and
convergent validity are further tested in the loadings and cross
loadings. Generally, item loadings greater than 0.6 on their
related factor are considered acceptable [5]. As expected, the
loadings within the construct met the threshold, and they
were higher than the loadings across constructs. In sum, the
psychometric properties are met, and the scales show accep-
table convergent and discriminant validity.
Expressing confidence in high performance was a forma-
tive construct for which the outer loadings are assigned beta
weights in a regression formula [59]. The weight for each item
signifies the item’s contribution to the construct. The weights
of the items are .75, .59, and –.06. According to Hair et al.
[32], the non-significance of the beta weights are not enough
to make an informed statistical decision on whether to drop
an item. Two other indicators should be consulted in the
following order: if the outer weight is significant, the items
should be kept. If they are not significant, the outer loadings
should be consulted. The latter, also known as the absolute
contribution (vs. relative contribution of beta weights), should
be above .5. If a formative item has a high beta weight and an
outer loading >.5, then the item should be kept. If the beta
weight is significant but the outer loading is <.5, there are two
options. Either the outer loading is not significant, in which
case dropping the item is advised, or the outer loading is
significant, in which case the researchers have to choose
whether they want to keep the item. In our data, none of
the items had an insignificant outer loading. Table 2 displays
the test results and the decision process of outer weights of
our formative construct.
The structural model (Figure 2) estimates the path coeffi-
cients, which are the measures of the relationship strengths
between dependent and independent variables, and the coeffi-
cient of determination (R2), which is the amount of variance
accounted for by the independent variables. Figure 2 shows
the paths and prediction levels of the model. Both the coercive
and the empowering approaches predict ~26.4% of the var-
iance in the intention to comply. The structural model sup-
ported two of the five hypothesized relationships. Enhancing
the meaningfulness of ISP compliance and expressing confi-
dence in effective compliance are positively related to the
intention to comply (H4: β = .225, p < .01 and H5: β = .402,
p < .001, respectively). Fostering participation in decision-
making was significant but unexpectedly negative (H3: β =
–.133, p < .05). Thus, H3 was not supported. The paths of
coercive approach techniques when considered vis-a-vis
empowering approach techniques were also not supported
(H1: certainty of sanctions and H2: severity of sanctions).
Results
Having tested coercive and empowering approaches in the
same model, we observe that the coercive approach is not
significant when empowerment is in place. We note that the
severity and certainty of sanctions tested alone are significant;
however, when the whole model is tested together, the coer-
cive approach loses its significance and power. Thus, our first
Table 1. Reliability measures.
Construct AVE Composite reliability Cronbach’s alpha
Intention to comply 0.673 0.861 0.758
Certainty 0.556 0.789 0.601
Severity 0.649 0.880 0.830
Meaningfulness 0.704 0.877 0.790
Participation 0.641 0.842 0.727
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major finding is that the coercive approach becomes insignif-
icant when tested with the empowering approach. Previous
studies have typically looked at either coercive or empowering
approaches separately with an emphasis on coercive
approaches for ensuring compliance. By examining both
approaches in the same model, we shed light on the relative
effectiveness of each. Our results should encourage future
researchers to continue delving further into empowering
approaches.
The three components of the empowering approach are
significant. However, the unexpected negative sign of one of
them, participation in decision-making, warrants mention. In
management studies of participation, it has been observed
that, although rare, participation sometimes has negative con-
sequences. For example, McClean et al. [54] found that voice
may sometimes lead to exit/turnover. In their study, voice
served as a measure of the engagement of employees in
challenging the status quo to improve the work setting.
Interestingly, making their voice heard is positively related
to turnover (voice leads to exit) if their direct managers are
not able or willing to engage in change. In a similar vein,
recent IS research has demonstrated that employees partici-
pating in IS strategy development were only satisfied with the
result if they were involved in the development of highly
innovative strategies; when they were involved in developing
conservative IS strategies, they expressed dissatisfaction with
the result and did not see the value of the strategy [49].
Perhaps something similar is at play in our study of compli-
ance, where participation in decision-making apparently led
to dissatisfaction, or, more specifically, the intent to not
comply. It is possible that users involved in security policy
decision-making try to make a case for less rigid policies;
however, their voices are ignored and the policies remain
rigid. In such cases, they may be unhappy and report low
intention to comply. Having a voice is not the same as being
heard. At his point, we can only speculate as to why users who
were involved in security policy decisions would express the
intent to not comply with the policies. Future research should
delve more deeply into this paradoxical issue.
To further probe this issue with our own data, we con-
ducted a post-hoc analysis. We divided our sample into those
who reported managerial experience (whom we label as man-
agers) and those who reported no managerial experience
(whom we label as employees). Recent literature indicates
significant differences between managers and employees
across a plethora of technology-related domains, including
the response to and use of HRM systems [45] and the sym-
bolic and behavioral response to enterprise social media sys-
tems [43].
Post-hoc analysis and discussion
Our post-hoc analysis investigates whether employee status,
specifically managers versus employees, plays a role in IS
compliance intention. Managers and employees constituted
60% (112 participants) and 40% (75 participants) of our
sample data, respectively. This categorization was based on a
question asking the number of years of work experience
followed by a question asking the number of years of manage-
ment experience.
Figures 3a and 3b show the paths and prediction levels of the
employees-only vs. managers-only. The employees-only model
and the managers-only model predict ~33.3% and ~28.4% of
variance, respectively. The figures demonstrate that the two
groups have different significant antecedents for compliance
intention. Whereas employees are motivated by participation
in decision-making and expressing confidence (H3: β = .189, p
< .05 and H5: β = .506, p < .001, respectively), managers are
motivated by the severity of sanctions and enhancing the
meaningfulness of compliance (H2: β = .132, p < .05 and H4:
β = .379, p < .001, respectively) as well as expressions of
confidence in their high performance (H5: β = .286, p < .001).
Table 3 gives the summary of the findings.
The first insight from this analysis is that participation in
decision-making was significant only for employees. We sug-
gest that subordinates are grateful for an opportunity to be
heard and will strive to make their opinions and voices count
[54]. Thus, a managerial approach that empowers users to
participate in forming, developing, and improving ISPs may
Table 2. Outer weights’ significance testing results.
Step B: Outer loadings
(absolute contribution) >.5
Formative construct Step A: Outer weights (relative contribution) Step C: Significance Suggestion – Decision
Expressing confidence in high performance Conf1 0.303768 *** 0.517239 *** Definitely keep - Kept
Conf2 0.467041 *** 0.777867 *** Definitely keep - Kept
Conf3 −0.057694 0.441515 *** Consider removing – Removed
***p < 0.001.
Figure 2. Structural model (managers and employees together without control-
ling for user position). *p < .05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Figure 3. Post-hoc analysis for (a) employees and (b) managers.
Table 3. Summary of findings.
Research model Path and significance Hypothesis support
Main (R2 = .264)
Certainty to Intention (H1) -.018 No
Severity to Intention (H2) .079 No
Participation to Intention (H3) -.133* No
Meaningfulness to Intention (H4) .225** Yes
Expressing Confidence to Intention (H5) .402*** Yes
Post-Hoc (Employees) R2 = .333
Certainty to Intention (H1’) .114 No
Severity to Intention (H2’) .028 No
Participation to Intention (H3’) .189* Yes
Meaningfulness to Intention (H4’) -.174 No
Expressing Confidence to Intention (H5’) .506*** Yes
Post-Hoc (Managers) R2 = .284
Certainty to Intention (H1”) .079 No
Severity to Intention (H2”) .132* No
Participation to Intention (H3”) -.137 No
Meaningfulness to Intention (H4”) .379*** Yes
Expressing Confidence to Intention (H5”) .286*** Yes
*p < .05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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appeal to employees and increase their motivation toward
higher compliance intention. However, this approach does
not appeal to managers. This could be attributable to several
reasons. Managers may already be so involved with decisions
of various natures that policy compliance decisions do not
strike them as an appropriate use of their time. Possibly, like
the managers in the study on participation and involvement
in IS strategy decisions, managers in our study only wish to be
involved in decisions outside of their functional unit when
those decisions are highly innovative or of strategic impor-
tance to the organization. Furthermore, while IS managers
would undoubtedly label security policy compliance decisions
as strategically important, general managers may not share
this view and may go so far as to resent having to spend time
on what they might consider as largely mundane decision-
making in another functional unit. Alternatively, the man-
agers may have had such high confidence in the IS depart-
ment’s ability to make security policy decisions that they did
not feel the need to be involved and even felt that their
involvement signaled a lack of competence of the IS manage-
ment. We cannot be certain as to why employees, but not
managers, respond favorably to involvement in IS security
policy compliance. It is an interesting contrast that merits
future research attention.
Second, enhancing the meaningfulness of compliance
appealed more to managers than to employees, which may
be partly explained by the contrast between “digital natives”
(the younger employees in our study) and “digital immi-
grants” (the older managers) [62], in which younger indivi-
duals are quicker to adopt the new technologies available
during their youth than are their elders, who tend to stick
with their habitual ways of doing things until their technolo-
gies are virtually obsolete [29, 57]. Younger “employees”
exhibit greater knowledge of technology, so may accept IS
security policies more readily than managers. Another expla-
nation lies in work roles. It is tenable to consider that non-
managerial employees might be accustomed to simply follow-
ing instructions, are less inclined to challenge policies, and,
consequently, are less in need of justifications for policies as a
motivation to abide by them. In contrast, managers are accus-
tomed to greater job autonomy and might be inclined to
disregard policies that they perceive as interfering with their
ability to perform at a high level. In this case, managers would
need to be convinced of the meaningfulness of the policies in
order to gain their compliance. Future research is necessary to
theorize and further examine the differences in response of
the empowerment approach to policy compliance based on
work roles.
A third insight from our analysis is that while the sever-
ity of the punishment for managers is significantly related
to their intention to comply, it is not significant for employ-
ees. Although the severity of punishment could have been
eclipsed in the perception of employees by a more positive
empowering approach, the idea of punishment is still rele-
vant and a powerful force to motivate managers toward
compliance intention. Straub and Nance [73] tested the
offender position and severity of discipline and found that
high-privilege users (including organizational managers and
IT senior executives) receive milder discipline than
medium- or low-privilege employees. They conclude that
organizations should stop this favored treatment because it
diminishes the deterrent effect on other employees. Our
data show that this only seems to be a problem for man-
agers and not for employees. Employees are not affected by
the severity of the punishment; instead, they are only
affected by the potential of punishment. In contrast, more
severe punishments are necessary to motivate managers to
comply. This suggests that managers may have an elevated
view of their own value and may assume a certain carte
blanche with respect to policies that they do not wish to
follow. They are motivated to abide by such policies only
when the potential punishment is quite substantial.
In comparing managers’ and employees’ responses to coer-
cive and empowering approaches to ISP compliance, we observe
only one common motivational factor for both groups—the
expression of confidence by immediate supervisors for effective
compliance. Perhaps this attests to the power of positive rein-
forcement across hierarchical levels in organizations.
In summary, our post-hoc analysis provides vivid indica-
tions of substantial differences in responses to motivational
ploys depending on individuals’ organizational role. While it
may not always be feasible for an IS department to target
different user groups with different motivational approaches
to encourage compliance, at the very least, managers should
be aware of these differences in responses and work to for-
mulate a security compliance policy that will align best with
the targeted users [41, 77]. Future research is needed to
examine specific aspects of security policies and how IS
departments can vary their motivational approach depending
on the predominant users of the systems in question.
Contributions
This study contributes to information security research in at
least three important ways. First, it expands the nomological
net by applying relevant constructs from reference disciplines,
including those from the theoretical lens of Theory X and Y,
and tests them in the information security context, where they
are found to be relevant. Second, it challenges the coercive
approach overemphasized in ISP research and contrasts it
with empowering approaches, and it finds the latter a more
effective avenue for security in a Middle Eastern context, an
under-researched region. Third, it reveals that different levels
of users may be affected by different types of coercive and
empowering techniques regarding ISP compliance.
Corley and Gioia [17] argue that a theoretical contribution
brings with it novelty and usefulness. Our research model is
new in that it incorporates both coercive and empowering
approaches and introduces several new variables—participa-
tion in ISP decision-making, awareness of the meaningfulness
of security policy compliance, and supervisor expression of
confidence in the compliance behavior of subordinates—to
ISP compliance research. Such findings provide useful
insights into both future research and managerial practice.
At the same time, our model is an extension of the existing
ISP compliance research that has drawn heavily from the
criminology theory of general deterrence. Moreover, our
study makes a solid empirical contribution, rather than a
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purely theoretical one. As recently argued by Agerfalk [1],
empirical contributions do not need to rely exclusively on “a
priori conceptualizations” but should reveal novel insights
into a phenomenon. Our finding that the empowering ante-
cedents may be more appealing to users than the more coer-
cive approaches sheds new light into security research, and
may inform other disciplines [9]. Moreover, by discovering
that different levels of users (managers vs. employees) may
need different blends of techniques to motivate them to com-
pliance, we provide new and important insights into the
phenomenon of IS security policy compliance. Future
research is advised to explore the needs of even different levels
of managers (high, middle, low).
This study also has considerable implications for practice.
Middle Easternmanagers, including information security man-
agers, should be aware that coercive approaches are sometimes
not the best approaches to adopt when encouraging ISP com-
pliance. This is an important finding in a region where the
culture is a relatively more hierarchical and inclined to high
distance than those of western countries. Sometimes, other
more positive techniques can go a long way toward motivating
users to comply with the existing policies. Managers should be
aware of the variety of positive empowerment techniques. In
this study, we proposed, and found useful, three such empow-
erment techniques. Another contribution to practice is the
empirical observation that one approach does not suit all
users equally well. Different user groups may respond differ-
ently to the range of positive and coercive techniques based on
their needs. This finding is consistent with the literature where
we find that multiple interventions at various levels may be
necessary to address IS security threat [14]. Future research
should investigate the effectiveness of other techniques, espe-
cially empowering ones, not just in the case of conventional
organizations but also increasingly in the contractual case
between outsourcing firms and the outsourcers commonly
called managed security service providers (MSSPs) [48].
Limitations
The present investigation was conducted in a single country,
presenting research advantages and disadvantages. Though
the generalizability to other countries may be questioned,
our findings are strengthened because (1) the cultural envir-
onment represents a new research context where research and
knowledge development is much needed and (2) IS theories
and research models should be tested in different cultures to
assess theories’ boundary conditions and to discover if the
variance models hold true in milieus other than western
cultures (see, for example, [36]).
Further, as with nearly all empirical studies in the informa-
tion security behavior domain, our dependent variable was
related to specific password policies instead of general security
policies. However, both managerial data and academic research
have shown that the password-policy scales are acceptable forms
of DVs and are effective indicators and representation of general
compliance questions. At the managerial level, CIO Magazine
recently reported that when IT managers were asked what their
number one organizational IT security priority was, they
responded that it was the increasing enforcement of security
policies on employees [24]. Specifically, “password policies”
made the top 5 list in their security policies (44% of respondents)
right after paying attention to vulnerable web applications
(55%), overall security awareness (51%), updating security
patches (50%) and encrypting PCs and sensitive data (47%)
[24]. Of these issues, only password policy compliance is an
employee-focused (not IT department) responsibility. Thus,
password policy compliance serves as an effective proxy for
general employee security policy compliance.
More significantly, academic research results support this
focus on password security as a valid measure of overall IT
security policy compliance, and has been the focus of numer-
ous empirical investigations (see, for example, [20, 69, 72].
The latter two studies as well as a study by Johnston et al. [40]
found no significant difference between password-policy
questions and other specific security policy questions.
Finally, our dependent variable measured the intention to
comply rather than actual compliance. Althoughmeasuring actual
compliance behaviors is often difficult, if not impossible [18, 78],
future research efforts should seek creative ways to collect objec-
tive data for the dependent variable. The use of NeuroIS measures
is proving to be an effective tool to study actual security behavior
[76, 80]. Future NeuroIS lab experiments on managers and
employees could be used to confirm (or not) these results in an
objective way, all the way opening the door to some more uncon-
ventional and probably controversial results.
Conclusion
As reported in our Results and Discussion sections, our
study tested and compared coercive and empowering
managerial approaches with regard to their impacts on
employee compliance with IS security policies. We discov-
ered that positive empowering approaches can be more
effective than coercive approaches. Furthermore, we dis-
covered that different managers and employees have dif-
ferent responses to the empowering approaches. On the
one hand, we found that managers are more persuaded to
comply when they have been convinced of the meaning-
fulness of compliance. On the other hand, our data sug-
gest that employees are more persuaded to comply when
they are given the chance to participate in forming and
developing IS security policies. We strongly suggest that
future compliance research take these differences into
account and explore what are the best approaches to
motivate different levels of employees or managers (high,
middle, and low) regarding compliance among different
types of insider threats (negligent, opportunistic, or mal-
icious). In addition, research could examine the relative
presence of negligent versus opportunistic users across
different levels and determine whether negligent users
may be more motivated by a certain empowering (or
coercive) approach, whereas opportunistic users may be
motivated by a different approach. Regardless of the spe-
cific avenue for research chosen, we strongly encourage IS
security researchers to consider the empowering approach
as a promising technique to inculcate greater IS security
policy compliance.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Measurement scales.
Constructs Items
Certainty of Sanctions (adapted from Tyler & Blader [75]) How closely is your IS security policy compliance monitored by your supervisor? (5 pt. Likert––
partially anchored - from “not at all” to “very much”)
How often is your supervisor paying attention to whether or not you follow the IS security policy
compliance rules? (5 pt. partially anchored Likert from “never” to “very often”)
Severity of Sanctions (adapted from Tyler & Blader [75]) If you are caught breaking an IS security policy compliance rule, how much does it hurt your pay? (5
pt. partially anchored Likert from “very little” to “a lot”)
If you fail to comply with your organization’s IS security policies, how much does that hurt your pay?
(5 pt. partially anchored Likert from “very little” to “a lot”)
If you fail to comply with your organization’s IS security policies, how much does that hurt your
benefits? (5 pt. partially anchored Likert from “very little” to “a lot”)
Fostering participation in Decision Making (adapted from
Zhang & Bartol [83])
My manager asks my opinion on the departmental implementation of IS security policy compliance
decisions that may affect me. (5 pt. fully anchored Likert from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
My manager often consults me on tactical decisions regarding how to effectively implement IS
security policy compliance practices in our department. (5 pt. fully anchored Likert from “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree”)
Enhancing meaningfulness of IS Security Policy Compliance
(adapted from Zhang & Bartol [83])
My manager helps me understand how my IS security policy compliance objectives and goals relate
to the company’s IS security. (5 pt. fully anchored Likert from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
My manager helps me understand the importance of my IS security policy compliance to the overall
information security effectiveness of the company. (5 pt. fully anchored Likert “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”)
Expressing Confidence in High Performance (adapted from
Zhang & Bartol [83])
My manager believes in my ability to improve when I make mistakes for the first time regarding IS
security policy compliance practices (ex: plugging in and opening a personal USB on the work-
related desktop without scanning the USB first) even if the training session has covered that practice
in the past? (5 pt. fully anchored Likert from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
My manager believes that I can handle IS security policy compliance practices even in the midst of
demanding tasks. (5 pt. fully anchored Likert from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
Behavioral Intention to Comply I intend to comply with the requirements of the password change policies of my organization in the
future. (7 pt. fully anchored Likert from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the password change policies of my
organization when I use information and technology in the future. (7 pt. fully anchored Likert from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
I intend to protect information and technology resources according to the requirements of the
password change policies of my organization in the future. (7 pt. fully anchored Likert from “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree”)
Marker Variables (adapted from Lo & Leidner [51]) Please rate how quickly your IT department is able to detect changes in customer demand: (5 pt.
partially anchored Likert from “no extent” to “very great extent”)
Please rate how swiftly your IT department is able to detect advances in technology that are relevant
to the business: (5 pt. partially anchored Likert from “no extent” to “very great extent”)
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Appendix B
Table B1. Descriptive statistics.
Industry
Agriculture 1%
Audit 5%
Banking and finance 11%
Education 16%
Communications 2%
Consumer products 2%
Construction 4%
Electronics 1%
Energy 1%
Fashion 2%
General services 1%
Government military 2%
Health care 15%
Information technology 2%
IT services 2%
Insurance 4%
Logistics 4%
Manufacturing 5%
Nonprofit 2%
Professional services 2%
Real estate 1%
Retail, wholesale 5%
Other 12%
Size of organization
Small size (1–200 emp.) 49%
Medium size (201–1000 emp.) 25%
Large size (over 1000 emp.) 26%
Gender
Female 52%
Male 48%
Tenure
Average years in current position 3.41
Average years with current organization 4.7
Average years of work experience 5.2
Average years of management experience 1.99
Min age 21
Max age 59
Mean age 29
Department
Accounting 11%
Customer service 8%
Finance 8%
Human resources 3%
Inventory 1%
Information technology 12%
Legal 2%
Management 10%
Operations 2%
Production or manufacturing 2%
Purchasing 3%
Quality assurance 1%
Research and development 4%
Sales or marketing 13%
Security 2%
Other 18%
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Appendix C
Appendix D
Table C1. Procedural remedies of common method variance.
Common method variance
source Description Remedy used in this research
1) Item demand
characteristics
Items may convey hidden cues as to how to respond
to them
Expert panel of 8 academicians
2) Item ambiguity Responding to them randomly or systematically using
their own heuristics
Expert panel of 8 academicians
3) Common scale formats Artificial covariation produced by the use of the same
scale format
Different scale format (5-, 7-, and 11-point Likert scales)
4) Common scale anchors Repeated use of the same anchor points Different use of anchor points (agree-disagree; never-very often; very little-a
lot. . .) and anchor types (drop down list; single answer horizontal)
5) Context-induced mood When the first question or set of questions induces a
mood for responding to the remainder of the
questionnaire
Randomized items within blocks and randomized blocks in both paper-
based and online versions
6) Reducing social
desirability
Protecting respondent anonymity and reducing
evaluation apprehension
In the introductory section, some statements tackled the preservation of
anonymity, assured there are no right and wrong answers, and encouraged
respondents to answer questions honestly to benefit academic research.
7) Improving scale items Define ambiguous terms; keep questions simple,
specific and concise
Expert panel of 8 academicians
Source: Podsakoff et al. [60]).
Table D1. Cross correlations.
Comp. Express confidence Certainty Meaningfulness Participation Severity
Intent 1 0.833 0.422 0.029 0.165 0.349 0.125
Intent 2 0.795 0.304 0.166 0.238 0.258 0.124
Intent 3 0.801 0.375 0.237 0.242 0.320 0.135
Conf 1 0.461 0.999 0.272 0.317 0.326 0.161
Conf 2 0.087 0.879 0.301 0.425 0.211 0.276
Certain 1 0.172 0.262 0.993 0.498 0.386 0.445
Certain 2 0.021 0.201 0.867 0.484 0.278 0.455
Mngf 1 0.231 0.268 0.483 0.894 0.521 0.206
Mngf 2 0.231 0.303 0.466 0.894 0.503 0.262
Part. 1 0.205 0.211 0.425 0.525 0.709 0.253
Part 2 0.348 0.299 0.365 0.547 0.921 0.113
Severity 1 0.057 0.158 0.394 0.257 0.183 0.743
Severity 2 0.048 0.198 0.487 0.216 0.054 0.739
Severity 3 0.186 0.122 0.408 0.223 0.127 0.954
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